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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 890256-CA

vs.
Priority No. 2

CHARLES WEBB,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are
as set forth previously in Appellant's Brief at pages 2-7.

The

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to the Respondent's
Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WEBB WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL DUE TO A CONFLICT OF INTEREST RESULTING
FROM THE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION'S JOINT
REPRESENTATION OF WEBB AND CO-DEFENDANT HUMPHREY.
Strickland and its progeny are determinative in an
ineffective assistance of counsel argument.

A different rule

applies when a defendant's claim is based on ineffective
assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest in
representation.

The general rule, with respect to the federal

constitutional guarantee of representation is:

(a) if a

potential conflict is brought to the trial court's attention

prior to or during trial and the trial court fails to act, the
mere existence of a potential or possible conflict will warrant
reversal without any further showing of prejudice.

Holloway v.

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); (b) if, however, the conflict is
not brought to the trial court's attention but is raised for
the first time on appeal, the defendant "must demonstrate the
existence of an actual conflict of interest.M

Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
The State agrees in its Response that Strickland is
inapplicable when an appellant claims ineffective assistance of
counsel due to a conflict of interest.

(Br. of Resp. at 7).

The State also agrees with the rules distilled from Holloway
and Cuyler concerning the showing appellant must make under the
federal constitution to warrant reversal for a conflict of
interest claim.

(Br. of Resp. at 8).

The State makes three main arguments:

(1) Webb failed

to raise a potential conflict of interest claim until after
trial, thus, he must establish an actual conflict of interest;
(2) a Legal Defender Association is not per se prohibited from
representing co-defendants, thus, Webb is unable to establish
either an actual or potential conflict of interest; and (3)
even if a conflict of interest existed, appellant's claim of a
conflict of interest must fail because appellant has failed to
show any resulting prejudice.

The first argument reflects a

dispute over the application of the law to the facts of this
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case, while the second and third arguments are erroneous
conclusions of law.
A.

A Potential Conflict of Interest Was
Adequately Raised by Webb at the Trial Level.

Webb's position is that a potential conflict of
interest was specifically raised in his Motion for a New Trial
and was intertwined with his earlier repeated requests to the
trial court for severance from his co-defendant; thus, under
Holloway, his conviction should be reversed.
While the State seems to agree that a potential
conflict of interest existed, and that Webb raised the issue in
his Motion for a New Trial, (Brief of Resp. at 8), the State,
nevertheless, argues that as in Cuyler, Webb's conflict of
interest claim was untimely requiring that he prove an actual
conflict of interest.

Cuyler is distinguishable.

In Cuyler, while associated counsel represented three
defendants, each defendant was tried separately; thus, the
Court stated:

"The provision of separate trials for Sullivan

and his co-defendants significantly reduced the potential for
divergence in their interests.*' Ld. at 337. Here, Webb and
co-defendant Humphrey were tried together.
Additionally, in Cuyler, nothing in the procedural
circumstances indicated that the trial court had a duty to make
inquiries regarding a potential conflict of interest.

Id.

Here, Webb's Motion for Severance, and co-defendant Humphrey's
Motions for Conflict of Interest and Trial Separation were
-3-

sufficient to alert the trial court to the potential for
conflict.
Finally, Sullivan failed to raise the issue in his
post conviction motions raising the issue for the first time
when he petitioned for collateral relief under the state
statutory Post Conviction Hearing Act, following the state
supreme court's affirmation of his conviction.

In the case

before this Court, the record is undisputed that Webb raised
the issue at the trial level when he moved for a new trial.
(Br. of Resp. at 8).
Significantly, State v. Tippetts, 584 P.2d 892 (Utah
1978), supports Wrebb's contention that because he raised the
issue in a Motion for a New Trial he need not prove an actual
conflict of interest.

In Tippets, when co-defendant Lopez'

attorney became ill on the day of the trial, Tippets attorney
agreed to jointly represent the defendants rather than delay
the trial with a continuation.

Tippets was convicted and

appealed, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel due to his trial attorney's conflict of interest.
While the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision the
Court stated:
Tippetts did not object to Esplin
undertaking to defend Lopez nor did Tippetts
move for a new trial or to set aside the
verdict. The issue of whether Tippets had
been deprived of his right to effective
counsel was first raised on appeal,
(emphasis added.)
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Id. at 893.
The Court's holding implicitly directs that a conflict
of interest claim should be raised at the trial level,
specifically, in a Motion for a New Trial.

Webb raised his

conflict of interest claim in a Motion For a New Trial.
This Court's statement in State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697
(Utah 1980), is applicable to the facts of this case and
refutes the State's argument that trial counsel failed to raise
the potential conflict in a timely manner:
We do not find the State's argument
persuasive. . . The attorneys responsible
for raising an objection did not do so. And
we cannot assume that under those
circumstances the attorneys advised
defendant of the conflict, nor that they
advised him that he must object on his own
behalf to avoid waiving his constitutional
right. 'The law will not assume that
counsel has advised his client of his
inadequacies or those of his associates,
(citation omitted).
Id. at 699.
While the facts of Smith are distinguishable, the
reasoning behind the Court's holding is appropriate in this
case.

Webb should not be penalized for his trial counsel's

failure to formally advise the Court before trial of the
potential conflict, especially where Webb and his co-defendant
adequately raised the issue pro se and in other motions.
The State's argument that Webb's counsel failed to
raise a potential conflict before the trial ignores the facts
of this case and the realities of the legal system.
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Webb's

privately retained counsel withdrew from the case after filing
a Motion to Sever Webb's trial from that of his co-defendant,
Humphrey.

This Motion was based on the lack of evidence

against Webb as the accomplice compared to the stronger
evidence against Humphrey as the actual robber.

The Court

failed to rule on the Motion and appointed the Legal Defender
Association (hereafter "L.D.A.") to represent both Webb and
Humphrey.

At this point, a potential conflict arose based on

the Rules of Professional Conduct, the A.B.A. Standards for
Criminal Justice/ and substantial case law warning against the
appearance of impropriety and joint representation in criminal
defense case.

See Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 400 A.2d 160

(Penn. 1979); State v. Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N. Mex. 1983).
B.

An. Actual Conflict of Interest Existed
Between Webb's Counsel and Counsel for
Co-defendant Humphrey.

Appellant argues in his opening brief that assuming,
arguendo, Webb failed to adequately raise the potential
conflict of interest at the trial level, his conviction should,
nevertheless, be reversed because an actual conflict of
interest existed when attorneys from the L.D.A. represented
both Webb and co-defendant Humphrey at trial.

Appellant admits

that while joint representation by associated attorneys is not
per se prohibited, joint representation in the case of
co-defendants is suspect and should be examined.
Smith, supra.
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State v.

In this case, Webb admits that the original joint
representation by the L.D.A. following the withdrawal of his
privately retained counsel was not a conflict per se.

A Motion

to Sever the trial of Webb and his co-defendant was before the
court.

The actual conflict existed when the trial court failed

to rule on Webb's Motion to Sever and Webb and his co-defendant
were jointly represented at trial by the L.D.A. in spite of the
evidence and Webb's desire to impeach the testimony of his
co-defendant.

See People v. Robinson, 402 N.E.2d 157 (111.

1980) (conflict raised by L.D.A.'s joint representation of
co-defendants in a murder trial cured by severance of their
trials.)
Respondents cite State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah
1986), and State v. Heaps, slip op. No. 16264 (S.Ct. filed
October 31, 1979)(unpublished), and argue that Utah courts have
addressed the issue of joint representation of co-defendants,
holding that such representation does not constitute an actual
conflict; however, Barella, and Heaps are distinguishable from
this case.
In Barella, the appellant and a co-defendant were
arrested and charged with distributing a controlled substance
for value.

Barella was convicted while his co-defendant plead

guilty to a lesser charge.

Both defendants were represented by

attorneys from the L.D.A..

On appeal, Barella alleged, for the

first time, that a conflict existed between his attorney and
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the attorney who represented his co-defendant.

This Court held

that a conflict did not exist.
Barella differs from the case currently before the
court in that Barella and his co-defendant were not tried
together, the conflict was not raised at trial, and there was
nothing in the record to support either an actual or potential
conflict of interest.

Here, Webb and his co-defendant were

tried together in spite of Webb's Motion for Severance, and
Webb's desire to impeach the credibility of his co-defendant.
In Heaps, a case decided before the Holloway/Cuyler
line of cases, the appellant's claim was based on the fact that
he was represented in pre-trial proceedings by the L.D.A., who
also represented an untried co-defendant.

Rejecting the

appellant's argument, this Court held that to prevail on a
conflict of interest claim, appellant must show that "there was
a conflict of interest which in some manner may have reacted to
the defendant's detriment."

Id. at 2.

In this case, as opposed to Heaps, there was "a
conflict of interest which in some manner may have reacted to
the defendant's detriment."

Webb and his co-defendant were

tried jointly in spite of Webb's attempts to have his case
severed from his co-defendants in order to fully pursue his
individual defense and impeach the credibility of his
co-defendant.
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In his opening brief, Webb chronicles how the conflict
of interest was apparent at trial:

(a) The joint theory of

defense pursued by his counsel in spite of the substantial
amount of evidence against Humphrey, including eyewitness
identifications; (b) the L.D.A.'s failure to pursue the Motion
to Sever filed by Webb's privately retained attorney; (c) the
lack of evidence against Webb; and (d) evidence that Webb was
out of state on the day of the robbery (T. 508).
The State responds that counsel's strategy cannot be
used to determine whether counsel was effective.
foregoing may be true, it is irrelevant.

While the

Webb offers the trial

record and trial strategy to establish the existence of a
conflict, a totally separate consideration.
While a per se conflict did not exist in the L.D.A.'s
joint representation of Webb and his co-defendant, an actual
conflict existed based on the fact that co-defendants with
adverse interests were represented by the L.D.A.

"Members of

the same association may not represent defendants with
conflicting interests, as there is a strong likelihood that
both have been privy to the confidences of both defendants."
State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980).
C.

Appellant Need Not Establish Prejudice to
Prevail On His Claim That He Was Denied
Effective Assistance of Counsel Due to a
Conflict of Interest.

Appellant establishes early in his opening brief that
its legal framework to analyze ineffective assistance of
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counsel due to a conflict4of interest differs significantly
from a traditional ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.
The State agreed in their responsive brief that Holloway and
Cuyler were the applicable standard rather than Strickland;
however, the State concludes its first argument by citing State
v, Geary, 707 P.2d 645 (Utah 1985), and stating, "In the
absence of a showing of prejudice, an ineffective assistance
claim must fail."

(Brief of Resp., at 16).

Geary is distinguishable because it involved a more
general claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rather than
the specific conflict of interest claim as asserted by Webb.
Additionally, Utah case law is clear that if an actual conflict
exists, effective representation is lost regardless of a
showing of prejudice.
The State further argues that defendant was
not prejudiced by the conflict of interest
of his attorneys. But the assistance of
counsel is among those constitutional rights
so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless
error.'0 Chapman v. California, . . . We
believe there is error here, and need not
inquire into whether the error was harmless,
because of the fundamental nature of the
constitutional rights involved. Holloway,
supra.
State v. Smith, supra.
Applied here, Webb's proof of actual conflict requires
reversal of his conviction without any other showing.
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POINT II
THE FIREARM ENHANCEMENT STATUTE WAS IMPROPERLY
APPLIED TO WEBB'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY.
The increased penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203(1) (Supp. 1988), were improperly applied to
appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery.

Webb's argument

is supported by well established principles of statutory
construction that "ambiguities in criminal statutes must be
resolved in favor of lenity."

State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558,

at 562, n, 3 (Utah 1987).
The State responds by arguing that because the 1989
Legislature amended the Aggravated Robbery statute by deleting
"firearm" and substituting "dangerous weapon," appellant is
precluded from prevailing on his claim.

The State's argument,

however, ignores the fact that Webb was convicted under the
1988 Aggravated Robbery statute.

The Legislature's

amendment

of the statute supports appellant's argument that in 1988 the
statute was ambiguous.

The State's argument does not address

Webb's claim that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be
resolved in his favor.

Id.

The State cites State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah
1986), for the proposition that the enhancement is applicable
to an Aggravated Robbery conviction; however, the State's
reliance on this case is misplaced.

The issue of whether the

enhancement was appropriately applied to an Aggravated Robbery
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conviction was never addressed by the Court in O'Brien.
Rather, O'Brien dealt with the length of enhancement sentencing
and supports appellant's argument that the maximum enhancement
sentence that a court may impose is five years, a point
conceded by the State.

(Br. of Resp. p. 51-52.)

The State also attempts to distinguish Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), by arguing that "the Federal
Bank Robbery statute did not include the use of a firearm as an
element of the offense."

The distinction raised by the State

supports Webb's argument.

The Court in Simpson refused to

allow the piggy-backing of penalties for the same conduct.

The

Court held that the government could not impose two separate
sentences for the use of a firearm.

Applied here, the State

should also be precluded from piggy-backing penalties.
CONCLUSION
The facts of this case present the perfect backdrop
for this Court to address an important area of substantive law:
Joint representation by the Legal Defenders Association of
co-defendants in a criminal case.

This Court should consider

the public policy arguments including the appearances of
impropriety and protection of the attorney-client privilege in
finding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to
all defendants and attorneys, including indigent defendants and
publicly appointed counsel.

Specifically, appellant
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respectfully requests that this court reverse the conviction
and grant defendant a new and separate trial with new counsel,
free of any conflict or appearance of impropriety.
DATED this

Si

day

of

August, 1989.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Sally 0. McMinimee
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that, on the

2J

day of August,

1989, I caused to be hand-delivered Jy true and correct copy of
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following:
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorney for Respondent
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